Leaf
Exchanging Ideas on Climate
National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy
www.nrtee-trnee.ca
Exchanging ideas on Climate

2.2.2 Regional and sectoral outcomes

Getting to 2050: Canada's Transition to a Low-emission Future — Advice for Long-term Reductions of Greenhouse Gases and Air Pollutants

The apparently small impacts on national economic performance under a broad-based carbon price mask regional and sector implications that may be of greater concern. Understanding the real or perceived distribution of impacts on regions and sectors is important since it tends to drive climate change policy in Canada. Where real income or employment effects are forecasted, the appropriate climate change policy response is to maintain the carbon “signal” and design complementary income and employment policies to smooth the transition and minimize dislocation. With this in mind, the following discussion explores regional abatement efforts, sectoral price and output effects, and costs to consumers. Again, the NRTEE recognizes the uncertainty inherent in our analysis, and therefore the following should be viewed as directional at best.  Regional abatement effort could ultimately be uniform but will differ in time: 

  • Regions will transition differently over time in response to emission pricing, with some taking action early and some later. Under a 65% reduction scenario, all regions ultimately contribute reductions more or less proportionate to their baseline emissions over the long term (See Figure 10). However, in the medium term, some provinces move first in response to the price signal, like Alberta and Saskatchewan, which would reduce about twice as much as the other provinces by 2020.  
     
  • Regions with the higher levels of emissions contribute more to the national reduction target. Since Ontario and Alberta emit more GHG, they reduce more total emissions, with Ontario accounting for about 20% of the national reductions and Alberta about 45%.

 

Figure 10: Provincial GHG emission reduction effort for 20%/65% share of national reductions and below regional baseline

  2020
Baseline
-20% in
2020
2050
Baseline
-65% 
in 2050
  Share of National Emissions Share of National Reductions Reductions below Baseline Share of National Emissions Share of National Reductions Reductions below Baseline
British
Columbia
12% 9% -14% 10% 9% -58%
Alberta 36% 48% -24% 43% 43% -66%
Saskatchewan 6% 10% -27% 5% 6% -72%
Manitoba 2% 1% -13% 1% 1% -61%
Ontario 27% 20% -14% 27% 27% -66%
Quebec 11% 7% -13% 9% 9% -64%
Atlantic 6% 5% -14% 5% 5% -66%

Sectoral abatement effort will likely not be uniform over time with some acting earlier than others. Notably, the industrial and energy supply sectors would likely provide more emission reductions by 2020, but in 2050 there could more or less be a convergence as the residential, transportation and commercial sectors catch up in response to the higher emission prices. Figure 11 provides the distribution in time of abatement effort by sector. The different responses of the sectors in terms of timing and magnitude point to the need for a flexible climate change policy signal, such as the emission price we have advocated in this Advisory Report.

Figure 11: Sectoral Abatement Effort

  2020 2050
Canada -20% -65%
Residential -15% -70%
Commercial/Institutional -13% -64%
Transportation -7% -61%
Total Industrial -17% -64%
Chemical Products -13% -67%
Industrial Minerals -36% -75%
Iron and Steel -6% -54%
Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting -5% -49%
Metals and Mineral Mining -9% -37%
Other Manufacturing -14% -66%
Pulp and Paper -32% -71%
Energy Supply -26% -68%
Coal Mining -3% -13%
Electricity Generation -23% -72%
Natural Gas Extraction -10% -33%
Petroleum Crude Extraction -41% -69%
Petroleum Refining -14% -75%

 

Sectoral profitability impacts and possible economic dislocations seem plausible under either a 45% or 65% reduction scenario, even when we assume that the world (and especially the United States) acts in concert to reduce GHG emissions. The extent to which domestic firm output may further decline and profitability effects intensify will be a function of how much product prices rise relative to international competitors. The logic of this assertion is straightforward and starts with the impact of the emission price on product prices. In domestic markets with little international competition, Canadian firms face the same emissions price with impacts differentiated by the relative abatement costs and emission intensities, where higher carbon-intensity firms face higher costs and possibly lower market shares. In this case, the major determinant of the profitability or economic impact will be any reduced demand for the product, for example a reduction in national coal demand as identified in Figure 12 below. For sectors exposed to international competition, either in domestic or international markets, the impact will be more strongly linked to relative emission prices between countries. If all countries more or less act in concert on emission pricing, competitiveness impacts largely disappear. But if countries do not move in concert and Canada imposes deep limits on emissions, there will be more pronounced competitiveness impacts leading to profitability reductions.

Figure 12:  Impacts on production costs and output

  Changes in Production Costs Relative to the BAU Changes in Output Relative to the BAU
  2020 2050  2020 2050
Residential 6% 1% -8% -5%
Commercial/Institutional 1%  1%  -2% -2%
Transportation 8%  1% -6% -5%
Industrial        
Chemical Products 17% 15% -6% -5%
Industrial Minerals  24% 20% -49% -50%
Iron and Steel  9% 13% -3% -4%
Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting  7% 7%  -3% -2%
Metals and Mineral Mining 3% 6% -2% -7%
Other Manufacturing  5% 5% -1% -1%
Pulp and Paper 2% 2% -6% -2%
Energy Supply      
Coal Mining  25% 93%  -6% -20%
Electricity Generation 31% 24% 6%  35%
Natural Gas Extraction 19% 39% -4% -9%
Petroleum Crude Extraction 30%  34% -3% -5%
Petroleum Refining 6% 6%  -12% -50%

Figure 12 traces out some of the possible price and output outcomes under our scenario where Canada acts with the industrialized world on deep reductions. With emission pricing under this scenario, we would expect the domestic energy system to move toward less carbon intensive energy sources. This is indeed observed in our modelling with significant growth in low-emitting sources of electricity (+40% from business-as-usual projections) and large reductions in carbon-intensive refined petroleum products (-50%) and coal (-20%). Figure 13 presents the associated fuel supply and demand under a long-term 65% reduction scenario.  The output of oil and gas remains more or less unaffected in our scenario reflecting the observation that continued global demand for oil will drive energy exports, even under global emission constraints and rising domestic production costs. If coal and petroleum product exports follow this possibility, the output declines we observe in Figure 13 could be reduced. That said, there would then be the associated issue of rising global emissions (or leakage) with more Canadian energy exports.

The reduction in output from industrial sectors, either in response to higher energy prices or as an abatement option, could be small on aggregate. Our modelling suggests decreases in the order of 3% below forecast levels in 2020 and 4% in 2050. Some sectors, like pulp and paper, may invest earlier and experience transitional output reductions that are largely reduced over time. Other sectors such as metals and mineral mining may make investments later in response to higher emission prices. The one exception to this story of a low overall output effect is industrial minerals, which primarily includes cement. This sector could experience large output reductions due to high abatement costs that raise product prices significantly (i.e., 30%), thereby reducing demand.  For the most part, the provincial and national stocks of housing remain stable, with some medium-term reductions in 2020 but a return to BAU forecasts by 2050. The quantity of commercial buildings and the transport sector remain unaffected in terms of size but instead would need to lower their carbon intensity considerably.

Figure 13:  Change in energy mix by sector

Residential Transportation
  2020 2050   2020 2050
Natural Gas -4% -6% RPPs -1% -57%
RPPs* -5% -28% Electricity 0% 11%
Electricity 9% 35% Hydrogen 0% 5%
Wood 0% 0% Renewable 0% 40%
Industrial Electricity
  2020 2050   2020 2050
Natural Gas -3% -6% Natural Gas 4% 8%
Coal 0% -1% Coal -11% -29%
RPPs -6% -19% RPPs 0% -2%
Electricity 4% 18% Renewable 7% 23%
Wood 5% 7%      

*Refined Petroleum ProductsFor the average household, price effects can be expected, with both “pain” and “gain” associated with deep GHG reductions. But these price effects are likely not outside the ongoing energy price swings we have experienced, and thus increased energy costs for households are probably important but not significant:

  • Electricity price increases for households could be expected in carbon-intensive provinces, such as Alberta and Ontario, in the order of 50% by 2050. Electricity price effects in other provinces would likely be lower. For space heating and domestic hot water in houses, natural gas costs could increase by about 60% by 2050, which is well below recent price swings. Gasoline prices could roughly double by 2050 from their historic level. To put this in context, Canadian retail gasoline prices in 2005 fluctuated from about $0.80 per litre to $1.20 per litre and then closed the year at about $1.05 per litre.
  • While many energy costs would increase, there could also be savings for households. The combined effect of building regulations that increase energy efficiency and emission pricing, which increases energy efficiency and demand conservation, is that households could consume considerably less energy. In our assessment, total energy expenditure per household falls 15% despite the increases in price. The cost of these savings is an increase in capital expenditure for energy efficiency actions, but the overall effect is positive with net overall savings for consumers.